On the Coat Tales of a Gambler
In an email to me, Alice Canfield shared her knowledge of Scarpone, and her aunt Jackie Knight. She also shared two links to websites, which she had discovered on the internet. One of the websites I had already seen during my research. It was the website I had discovered with the list of names having connection to the Robstown Sheriff’s murders with a vague mention of Ladrón Scarpone, a known gambler and deadliest man in the south. However, the other link was of significant importance. The link Canfield provided an actual court document of Scarpone’s murder trial appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court. During my research, the chronological order of events for the outcome of Scarpone’s murder disappeared from the Internet. Nevertheless, with the link to new court proceedings for John Ladrón, which you will read shortly, shows that Scarpone was in fact convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 15 year for the murder of George Blackwell. However, after his conviction, his lawyer appealed Scarpone’s case. We do not know if Scarpone was free while on appeal but probably can assume yes after reading the appeal case.
State v. Ladrón
261-437 (1973)
200 -2d 387
The STATE, Respondent, v. John Ladrón, Appellant.
19722
Supreme Court of Alabama.
November 7, 1973.
Irvin Myers, Esq., of Robstown, for Appellant.
*438 Joseph W. Gibson, Esq., of Robstown, for Respondent.
*439 Irvin Myers, Jr., Esq., of Robstown, for Appellant, in reply.
November 7, 1973.
The appellant Ladrón was charged with having murdered one George Blackwell on or about November 30, 1971, and was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to a term of fifteen years at the October 1972 term of the Court of General Sessions for Robstown County. They said Blackwell received a mortal bullet wound at a Robstown nightclub known as the “B.B.C. Club”. A number of pistol shots were fired at the time and place, one other party in addition to Blackwell receiving a mortal wound and the appellant Ladrón receiving a serious wound.
Since there must be a new trial, we will not review the testimony in detail. Numerous witnesses and Ladrón himself testified. Ladrón admitted having a pistol and striking Blackwell therewith but contended that the same flew out of his hand; that he never fired the same, and did not inflict upon Blackwell his mortal wound. There was evidence from other witnesses to the effect that Ladrón did fire his pistol and inflict upon Blackwell the mortal wound. Still other evidence was to the effect that the first shot fired was one by Blackwell which wounded Ladrón.
Ladrón having denied the killing, he of course did not seek, by his testimony, to justify the killing on the theory of self-defense, and no charge as to the law of self-defense was made or requested. After the jury deliberated for a time, it requested further instructions from the judge in the following language:
“Sir, when we were talking, if the deceased fired the gun first and Mr. Ladrón fired back and killed the man would this be self-defense and require a not guilty verdict?”
*440 The court declined to answer the question as phrased, and a juror then rephrased it as follows:
“In our state is there such a defense and (as) self-defense?”
The court excused the jury to afford opportunity to consider what further charge, if any, should be given. Counsel for Ladrón then took the position that the evidence raised an issue of self-defense and that the court should comply with the request of the jury and charge the law of self-defense, although counsel had not initially requested such. After some colloquy with counsel, the court concluded that the evidence raised no such issue, recalled the jury, and, in effect, instructed it that there was “in Alabama such a thing as the law of self-defense” but that he would not instruct the jury thereabout because the issue had not been raised by the testimony or evidence.
Under all of the circumstances reflected by the record and the applicable law, we are of the view that His Honor was in error. It would not be appropriate for us to presently state in detail the evidence, it being sufficient to say that in our opinion there is ample evidence in the record from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that, contrary to Ladrón’s denial of the actual killing, he did in fact inflict the mortal wound upon Blackwell but that such was inflicted in self-defense.
The inquiry of the jury related to a material issue in the case, raised by the evidence in the case, as to which there had been no charge by the judge or request to charge by counsel. Under the circumstances, we are convinced that it was the duty of the trial judge to give the jury instructions responsive to their request and the failure to do so was prejudicial error. Ct. State v. Bargeman, 249 ABL. 61, 152 N.E. (2d) 354; State v. Anderson, 126 ABL. 207, 84 N.E. (2d) 626.
Where the accused admits the killing but seeks to justify such on the theory of self-defense, it is of course incumbent upon the accused to prove the *441 essential elements of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence, he still being entitled to any reasonable doubt as to whether such defense has been proved. Where, however, the accused denies the killing, the following principles determine whether or not he is entitled to a charge on the law of self-defense. If there is evidence that, contrary to the denial of the accused, he did inflict the mortal wound and no evidence whatever from which it could be inferred that he did so in self-defense, he, of course, is not entitled to a charge on the law of self-defense. If, however, there is any evidence in the record from which it can be reasonably inferred that the accused inflicted the mortal wound but justifiably did so in self-defense, then the accused is entitled to a charge on the law of self-defense, despite his denial of having inflicted the mortal wound. These principles seem to be clearly established by the weight of authority in this jurisdiction as well as elsewhere. State v. Moore, 131 ALB. 276, 126 N.E. 766; State v. Colman, 231 ALB. 294, 127 N.E. 264; State v. Puttman, 437 ALB. 75, 134 N.E. 514; 41 J.S.C. Homicide § 357, p. 163; 40 Am. Jur. (2d) 766, Homicide, Sec. 401; West’s Decennial Digest, Homicide, Key No. 700 (8).
Numerous other questions are raised but for the most part they will not likely reoccur upon a retrial of the case and, hence, we do not need to discuss or decide the same. One other question should probably be mentioned at least to a limited extent. Sequestration of all witnesses in the case was granted upon motion of both the State and the defendant. During the course of the trial and while the defendant was in the process of presenting his witnesses, the court ruled, upon motion by the State, that the defendant could not personally confer with his witnesses.
Counsel concedes that the court might appropriately require the presence of either the defendant’s counsel or an appropriate officer of the court during any conference by the defendant with any sequestered witness, but urges that it was error on the part of the judge to refuse the *442 defendant access to his witnesses prior to presenting them, as such prevented him from assisting his counsel with the preparation and presentation of his defense. The colloquy between the court and counsel at the time of this ruling leaves, to say the least, doubt as to whether the ruling was appropriately objected to, and we, accordingly, refrain from deciding whether the ruling constituted prejudicial error which would require reversal. We do, however, make the following observations which may be of some help and guidance to the court should the issue reoccur upon the retrial of the case.
We have previously held that it is permissible for the solicitor to interview witnesses while they are under sequestration order. State v. Moore, 131 ALB. 276, 126 N.E. 766. Certainly, the same would hold true for defense counsel, which the trial judge here seemed to recognize.
“The party calling witnesses, or his counsel, is not, in general, deprived of the right to consult with them in a proper manner by the fact that they have been placed under the rule * * *.” 23 C.S.J. Criminal Law § 1019, p. 1043.
By virtue of their constitutional rights, persons accused of crimes are entitled to be present at every stage of the trial and are, therefore, exempt from the rule of exclusion of witnesses. They are entitled to representation by counsel, and to a full opportunity to assist and cooperate with their counsel in presenting their defense or defenses. The right of a criminal defendant to present witnesses in his behalf is a basic, constitutional safeguard and it follows that any rule which abridges this right must be examined with close scrutiny. It would seem elementary that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to confer with his proposed witnesses before presenting them as he of necessity needs to know what, if any, testimony they can truthfully offer in his behalf or in rebuttal to the evidence offered by the State. This is not to say, however, that the *443 court in affording the accused an opportunity for such conference with his witnesses may not take reasonable precaution to see that the purpose of the rule of sequestration is not defeated, and normally requiring the presence of defense counsel, who is himself an officer of the court, should be adequate precaution to preserve the purpose of the rule.
For the reasons hereinabove set forth, the judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
MOSLY, S.V., and CLARK, BRADSFERD and LITTLEJOHN, JJ., concur.
Scarpone was found guilty of manslaughter and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. However, the case was taken before the Supreme Court of Alabama. The decision of the court was in favor of Scarpone, with the judgment reversed and remanded.
I feel that answering the question of did Scarpone have a second trial, may go unanswered. Even though Sailor’s granddaughter discovered this appeal, between her efforts and mine, neither of us found the trial verdict and sentencing for the first trial. Neither of us came across any information regarding a retrial. Perhaps it is because the state chose not to proceed with a second trial. Perhaps there were payoffs to prosecutors and or judges? Maybe a gangster killing another gangster is simple enough justice in those days and it all was swept under the rug?
It does not mean those stories are not available. However, if they are available, I am stymied for answers that do not show up in search engines. The other option would be to retrieve archived editions of the news source in print, from the end of 1972 through 1973 and maybe years after that. I have exhausted the Internet search for newspaper articles and sourcing Scarpone’s real name to no avail.
Assuming Sailor’s statements of how the cops and the authorities were on the take, it seems to suggest that the Robson police might not have had a forthright attitude to investigate illegal activities. For one, the Robstown sheriff’s murder appears as a cover up with a conviction of an innocent man who ended up taking the fall for the murdered of a sheriff who seemed to be on the verge of busting a scandal of illicit affairs of prominent citizens. Scarpone seems too lucky, skating by the law, having been involved in four killings not to mention of a life of cheating and gambling.
It has been several months since I began writing this episode. I admit over the summer (2024) I had other interests. I have not had renewed contact with Alice Canfield since her mention of letting me know that if she came upon anything new she’d let me know. Sailor has not commented on Scarpone’s appeal and the reversed and remanded decision by the high court. I understand being busy.
I feel that I have a couple of other options out there, yet to throw darts at, nevertheless. So, as an affirmation to continue to the end, until I know the end, I am going to close this episode in the same way that I have closed all the previous episodes.
On the Coat Tale of a Gambler continues in
Episode 31- So, What’s Next?